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Environmental Law
By Michael B. Gerrard

T

Survey of SEQRA Cases From 2007

he courts issued 58 decisions under the New
York State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA) in 2007.1
Typically, plaintiffs have a much
greater chance of success in SEQRA cases when no
environmental impact statement (EIS) has been
prepared: on average, in the cases from 1990 (when this
column’s annual survey began) through 2006, plaintiffs
won 15.9 percent of the cases where there is an EIS,
and 38.6 percent of the cases without an EIS.
But in 2007 the ratio was much different. In the
22 cases with an EIS, plaintiffs won seven, or 31.8
percent. In the 27 cases without an EIS, plaintiffs
won five, or 18.5 percent. (The remaining nine cases
were unclassifiable.)
The 31.8 percent plaintiffs’ victory rate in cases
with an EIS is the second-highest in the 18 years of
this survey; the highest was 54 percent in 2001, and
now the third-highest was 28 percent in 1995.
The two most common issues in the 2007 decisions
were whether a supplemental EIS is needed, and
whether there had been improper segmentation. On
both issues, the decisions were fairly evenly split. There
were also several decisions on whether the challenges
were timely; whether the plaintiffs had standing to
sue; and whether the subject actions were exempt
from SEQRA.

Supplementation
Seven of the 2007 decisions concerned whether
supplemental review was needed. In four, such review
was found to be needed; in the other three, it was
found to be unnecessary.
One of the cases in the latter category was the
only Court of Appeals case under SEQRA in 2007,
Riverkeeper v. Planning Board of the Town of Southeast.2
An application to build the subject residential project
had been filed back in 1988. An EIS was prepared,
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followed by a supplemental EIS in 1991. The project
appeared to languish, but it received its conditional
final approval in 2002. Opponents sued on the grounds
that a second supplemental EIS was needed because of
various new developments, including, among others,
expansion of the delineated wetlands area on the site by
the Army Corps of Engineers; then-Governor George
Pataki’s designation of the Croton Watershed as a
“Critical Resource Water”; the flagging of additional
water courses; and the increase in the number of storm
water basins. The trial court remanded to the Planning
Board to determine whether a second supplemental
EIS was needed. On remand, the Planning Board kept
to its original decision not to require a supplemental
EIS. The trial court found that was permissible, but
the Appellate Division reversed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division and found that no supplemental EIS was
needed. It described the decision whether to require
a supplemental EIS as a “fact-intensive determination
[where] the lead agency has the discretion to weigh and
evaluate the credibility of the reports and comments
submitted to it and must assess environmental concerns
in conjunction with other economic and social planning
goals…. It is not the province of the courts to secondguess thoughtful agency decision-making.” Moreover,
the Court held, “The lead agency, after all, has the
responsibility to comb through reports, analyses and
other documents before making a determination; it is
not for a reviewing court to duplicate these efforts.”
One important question in the case was whether

the lead agency should have waited for other agencies
to complete their permitting processes. The Court
declared that “[a] lead agency improperly defers its
duties when it abdicates its SEQRA responsibilities to
another agency or insulates itself from environmental
decision-making,” but that had not occurred here.
Indeed, “[p]rovided that a lead agency sufficiently
considers the environmental concerns addressed by
particular permits, the lead agency need not await
another agency’s permitting decision before exercising
its independent judgment on that issue.”
Citing Riverkeeper, the Appellate Division, Third
Department, subsequently upheld a town’s imposition of
conditions on a proposed project, including other state
and federal requirements. “Rather than an improper
deferral of its independent judgment, as alleged by
[plaintiff], the board’s imposition of conditions reflects
a proper effort to mitigate concerns identified during
the review process,” the court held.3

Segmentation
Segmentation was another hot topic under SEQRA
in 2007. Three cases found there was improper
segmentation; four found there was not.
In AC I Shore Road LLC v. Inc. Village of Great
Neck,4 the Second Department considered a plan
for the redevelopment of the waterfront along
Manhasset Bay. The plan included residential and
mixed-use projects. At the same time, the village
was considering a plan to decommission its sewage
treatment plants and divert the sewage, by pipe,
from the north shore of Long Island to another
treatment plant on the south shore. An EIS was
prepared for the proposed development but it did
not analyze the potential environmental impacts
of the sewage diversion plan. The court found this
to be improper segmentation, as “[t]he record belies
the appellants’ contention that the sewage diversion
plan was speculative, hypothetical, and not part of
a larger unified plan.”
Under somewhat similar facts, a court invalidated
an EIS on a comprehensive zoning plan because it did
not consider the associated construction of a sewage
treatment plant.5
Impermissible segmentation was also found where
a multi-use project called the Stanford Crossings
Project was considered separately from an adult
home. The court found that “the construction of
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the Stanford Crossings Project and the adult home
are complimentary components of the same project
in that they were planned together, are financially
interrelated and neither could proceed in the absence
of the other.”6
The Third Department found a cumulative impact
analysis to be adequate, notwithstanding a contrary
view by the trial court.7

Timing
Confusion persists on when SEQRA lawsuits
can or must be brought. Following the commonly
accepted rule, one court found that a challenge to
the issuance of a positive declaration (a decision
requiring that an EIS be prepared) was not yet ripe.8
However, a different court agreed to review a positive
declaration because it “will require petitioner to
expend substantial time and money participating
in a scoping session, preparing a DEIS [Draft
Environmental Impact Statement], and completing
the remainder of the SEQRA review process, and
those expenditures cannot be recouped even if the
petitioner ultimately obtains the right to complete
the project.” Thereupon the court found that the
lead agency had not sufficiently explained why it
was issuing a positive declaration, and remanded to
the agency for additional factual findings.9

Standing
Three suits were dismissed because the petitioners
lacked standing to sue. In one, the petition alleged
that the individual petitioners either reside or own
properties located at specific addresses alleged to be
across the street, adjacent to or in close proximity
to the subject district, but “the allegations are not
supported by competent evidence.”10 This decision
suggests that petitioners must submit affidavits or
similar documentation of their proximity with
their petitions, something that is certainly not
universal practice. The two other decisions involved
petitioners who indisputably live about a mile from
the subject site, which in both cases the court found
was too far.11
Four villages were found to have standing to
challenge a rezoning action in an adjoining town.
The Second Department declared that “[t]he
power to define the community character is a
unique prerogative of a municipality acting in its
governmental capacity,” and that “the right to
continue to exercise that authority …in the face of
the potential threat posed by the Town’s action with
respect to the property along the villages’ borders” is a
basis for standing under SEQRA because “[s]ubstantial
development in an adjoining municipality can have
a significant detrimental impact on the character of
a community.”12
No SEQRA decision in 2007 dismissed a suit
because the petitioners had not shown that they would
be affected by the project in a different way than the
public at large, the controversial requirement imposed
by the Court of Appeals in Society of the Plastics Industry
v. Suffolk County.13

Developers’ Challenges
Project developers prevailed in all four SEQRA
cases they brought that were decided in 2007. In Lowe’s
Home Centers Inc. v. Venditto,14 the court directed a
town to make a written determination with respect
to the adequacy of petitioner’s draft EIS within 30
days of the service of the court order. The town had
delayed nine months in making its determination up
until the time the applicant formally requested it, even
though the SEQRA regulations contemplate that such
a determination will be made within 45 days of the
receipt of the draft EIS.
In the second case, the town rezoned certain
property, allegedly rendering it undevelopable. The
court agreed with the property owner that the town
had not made a reasoned factual elaboration of the
reasons for its decision, and the court annulled the
rezoning.15
In the third case, the court found that a village
“failed to provide a reasoned elaboration of the basis
for its statement of findings” under SEQRA when
it imposed apparently onerous conditions on the
development, “and instead based the statement of
findings on generalized, speculative comments and
opinions of local residents.”16
The other victory by developers came where the
town board had denied the petitioner’s application for
site-plan approval without providing any reasoning
for the denial. The court found the town board must
explain its decision.17

Exemptions From SEQRA
In the four challenges to assertions that certain
actions were exempt from SEQRA, the exemptions
prevailed in three. These were cases finding that
SEQRA did not apply to the refinancing of existing
debt;18 the issuance of a demolition permit, even if
the demolition would affect a historic property;19 and
an action subject to the Adirondack Park Act.20 A
claim of exemption was rejected for a local law that
opened routes traversing forest lands for use by allterrain vehicles.21

Socioeconomic Impacts
In a case concerning the controversial Atlantic
Yards project in Brooklyn, the Second Department
upheld a condemnation action in the face of claims
that the EIS had inadequately addressed the project’s
socioeconomic and displacement impacts.22

Fatal Procedural Flaws
Three actions were annulled where, notwithstanding
adequate compliance with SEQRA, there were other
fatal procedural flaws. In the first case, an EIS was
upheld, but the town’s action was annulled because
it involved a change in a prior town determination
without any explanation for the switch.23
In the second, an EIS was upheld but the project
approval was annulled because the town had not sent
the final EIS to the County Planning Board, as required
by the General Municipal Law.24

The final case involved a remarkably indiscrete letter
from a certain planning board chair. A rezoning to allow
development of a multifamily housing project received
a negative declaration. The Fourth Department upheld
the negative declaration but struck down the Planning
Board’s ensuing site-plan approval. As the court wrote,
“the Planning Board’s chairperson manifested actual
bias when she wrote a letter to the mayor supporting
both the rezoning and the project, noting therein that
she ‘would really like to see new housing available to
[her] should [she] decide to sell [her] home and move
into something maintenance free’….We conclude
that the appearance of bias and actual bias in this
case require annulment of the Planning Board’s
site-plan approval.”25
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